Bodily autonomy—the right to decide what happens to one’s own body—is affirmed in the United Nations’ human rights framework and ought to be regarded as inviolable. In reality, however, it proves to be largely theoretical. The Swedish state routinely grants itself extensive powers at the expense of its citizens.
Do you believe that you own your body? That it is yours to do with as you wish? That you have a right to bodily autonomy?
It is a popular belief. Yet upon closer examination, one is forced to conclude that it is largely untrue. Although human rights principles emphasise bodily autonomy, the state has established an extensive set of rules governing what people may do with their own bodies—even in matters that affect no one but themselves.
This is a matter of principle. What distinguishes a liberal democracy is that laws are enacted to protect individuals from having their rights violated by other people, not to override an individual’s right to self-determination.
The state’s unjustified authority is evident, for example, in the fact that individuals have no right to choose assisted dying. In September, a woman was sentenced to prison after helping her husband to die. His documented consent, and the fact that she had attempted to take her own life at the same time, made no difference. The fact that he had asked for her assistance was not considered exculpatory; his wishes were barely relevant in legal terms.
Assisted suicide and euthanasia are legal in a number of countries, but only under specific circumstances. A simple desire to die is not accepted as justification, regardless of whether it is connected to mental illness. Assistance is generally restricted to those who are terminally ill and suffering severely. The authority that the state has claimed over the individual’s body—and life itself—is thus permitted to override the individual’s own claim to both.
These restrictions are often justified on the grounds that they reflect the moral views of the majority. Few people regard it as a serious problem that sexual relations between close relatives are prohibited in many circumstances, or that individuals have only limited legal capacity to consent to violence against themselves.
Yet failing to defend the principle of bodily autonomy simply because one has no desire to cross those particular boundaries is rather like refusing to defend freedom of expression because one has nothing to say. People have been convicted despite demonstrable consent. For some, these restrictions are not theoretical but deeply consequential. They create a form of moral majoritarianism—a tyranny of the majority—which runs contrary to the principles of liberal democracy.
What distinguishes a liberal democracy is that laws are enacted to protect individuals from having their rights violated by other people.
The state’s role should therefore be limited to ensuring that violations of consent are punished. It should not be taking a position on actions undertaken between consenting adults.
Instead, the state’s authority over our bodies is treated as so self-evident that it is rarely questioned. This enables a wide range of paternalistic and restrictive laws, from compulsory motorcycle helmets to smoking bans and licensing requirements for public dancing. When the state consistently fails to respect individual bodily autonomy, it is hardly surprising that proposals such as the one put forward by Christian Democrat politician Ella Bohlin in October—that all citizens should automatically be registered as organ donors—receive support.
Such a measure would undoubtedly increase the number of registered donors. It would also increase the number of people listed in the register who do not, in fact, wish to donate. Negative enrolment—the practice of binding individuals without their active consent—has precisely this effect, which is also why it is generally prohibited in other contexts.
Ensuring meaningful consent can, admittedly, be legally complex. Doctors’ reluctance to perform assisted dying deserves respect. Reckless decisions by individuals may impose costs on the public sector. The shortage of transplant organs is a genuine problem.
But these are problems that can be addressed. They are not legitimate reasons to curtail citizens’ bodily autonomy.
The role of the state is not to act as an overprotective parent to citizens deemed incapable of knowing what is best for themselves and therefore in need of protection from poor choices. On the contrary, its role is to protect the individual’s right to be unreasonable, irrational and foolish.
Only when a person’s actions infringe upon the rights and freedoms of others does the state acquire both the right—and the obligation—to intervene.
Not before.
This article was originally published in Smedjan (Timbro) on 12 December 2019.
