When Stockholm rejected the United States’ demand to abolish its diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programmes, it risked more than diplomatic displeasure. Sweden’s dependence on American cloud services means that a capricious US administration could, quite literally, shut down large parts of Swedish public administration at the press of a button. This is not primarily a question of technology. It is a question of national security.
In May 2025, Stockholm City Council rejected a request from the US Embassy that the city dismantle its diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programmes.
I do not know precisely which applications Stockholm uses or where its data is stored. However, it is far from unlikely that, like many public-sector organisations, it has become dependent on American companies and services such as Microsoft, AWS and Google.
Stockholm’s refusal to comply with the embassy’s request could therefore, in theory, have led to those companies receiving instructions from US authorities to restrict or disable certain services on national security grounds. Such measures are entirely possible under US law.
That did not happen. But the scenario I am describing is neither implausible nor far-fetched.
Because it has already happened.
The most recent example is Microsoft’s decision to block the email account of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague following sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. His bank account in the United Kingdom was also frozen.
For Sweden, this vulnerability extends to large parts of the country’s digital infrastructure: the systems that enable public institutions to function. It includes school platforms, healthcare records systems, financial administration, social services data and municipal budgeting. It also encompasses everyday workplace applications such as Microsoft Outlook and Teams.
In short, the current US administration possesses the practical ability to disrupt large parts of Swedish public administration if it chooses to do so. Such an action would make the 2024 ransomware attack on Tietoevry seem relatively minor by comparison.
This represents a far greater threat to the functioning of society—and, I would argue, a far more plausible one—than the prospect of Trump ordering troops onto Swedish territory.
(Although that judgement admittedly rests on the assumption that his actions remain rational and reasonably predictable, an assumption that may itself be questionable.)
This is therefore not primarily a technological issue. It is a matter of national security.
Sweden finds itself in this position because it has prioritised operational convenience over secure and independent operation. That approach will work perfectly—right up to the point at which it no longer does.
And that point could arrive at any moment, particularly given the volatility of the current US administration.
It is remarkable, though perhaps not surprising, that the Swedish government, along with much of the public sector, continues to bury its head in the sand.
Further Reading
Opinion: Europe Needs Digital Sovereignty
“The United States can instruct its technology giants to withdraw from Denmark unless Greenland is handed over, effectively paralysing Danish society. Today, there is no meaningful distinction between digital sovereignty and sovereignty itself.”
Read the full article here: Europe Needs Digital Sovereignty
